Corrections

We get things wrong. When we do, we fix them and log the notable ones here — what changed, why, and when — rather than quietly editing them away as if nothing happened. The first three are small corrections we caught during our pre-launch review (2026-07-03); none of them is a disaster. Any corrections after we go live will land here the same way. If you spot something off, tell us on the contact page.

2026-07-03 · An on-chain fee claim was too absolute

What changed: In pre-launch review we found a draft on choosing a withdrawal network that described one network's fee as close to "free." That was overstated. We changed it to: "on-chain fees are very low, but not zero, and they move with network conditions — the amount that counts is whatever your wallet or Binance's withdrawal page shows at the time."

Why: On-chain fees change. Writing it too absolutely can leave someone thinking it's always free, and then a congested network hands them a real charge they weren't expecting. A qualitative statement plus "per the page shown" is more reliable than a claim that goes stale.

2026-07-03 · A freeze-duration claim was pinned to a fixed number

What changed: In pre-launch review we found a spot where a draft gave the length of an account freeze as a single fixed figure, which read like a guarantee. We changed it to a range and made it explicit: "whether an account is frozen and for how long is a range decided by banks and the authorities; this site can't estimate or promise it."

Why: Freeze duration varies with the case, the bank, and the jurisdiction — there is no single universal number. Pinning one down is both inaccurate and sets people up with unrealistic expectations. Saying honestly "who decides, and a rough range" is the truer version.

2026-07-03 · Added a note that spreading trades is not a way to evade monitoring

What changed: In pre-launch review we found that the pieces on sizing trades and using a dedicated account originally only explained how to lower the risk of getting caught up in someone else's dirty money, without stating the intent plainly. We added an explicit note: these practices are meant to spread the risk of ordinary funds — they are not, and cannot be, a way to evade monitoring or AML checks; if the source of funds is itself a problem, no arrangement can clean it or make an investigation go away.

Why: This is a compliance line, and it has to be said out loud so no one misreads it as "how to hide." We only cover compliant self-protection; for anything legal, follow your local law and consult a qualified lawyer.

2026-09-09 · Registration guide: the referral code step was described in the wrong place

What changed: Our walkthrough from sign-up to your first USDT buy said the registration page may show a referral-code field and told you to review it before submitting the form. That put the step in the wrong place. We changed it to: the first screen asks only for an email or phone number; the referral code step appears after the account is created, pre-filled and marked as bound if you came from a referral link, changeable if invalid, skippable if you have none, and locked once bound.

Why: On 2026-09-08 we reopened the Binance registration page in a browser and re-read Binance’s help-center registration guide. Sending people to look for a referral field on the signup form points them at something that isn’t there, and hides the one detail that actually matters: once bound, the code can’t be changed.

2026-10-03 · Buying guides: the seller's "release" step was written into the buyer's side

What changed: How to spot dirty-money merchants said "you pay with local fiat … but the money you received may be exactly what a victim was defrauded of." A buyer is the one paying, so a buyer receives no fiat; the direction was wrong. It now says the account you paid into may be collecting stolen money at the same time, so your payment shows up when that account is traced, and that the seller is the one who can receive stolen funds directly. The same page's second signal ("rushing you to release"), the third trap in buying USDT via P2P for the first time ("being rushed to confirm release"), and similar lines in the full P2P buying guide and the merchant-vetting guide put a seller's action into the buyer's flow: when you buy, the release button is on the seller's side. They now describe the two pushes a buyer actually meets — being told to tap "I have paid" before paying, and being told to cancel after paying — and the first-buy guide gains the steps for appealing when a seller won't release. The matching question and tip in the freeze-risk self-check tool were changed the same way. The Chinese pages were corrected the same day.

Why: Binance's English help pages, checked on 3 October 2026: "How to Cancel Your Binance P2P Buy Order" (updated 2025-12-29 per Binance) says "Please do not cancel the order if you have already paid the seller."; "How to Appeal for P2P Orders on the Binance App" (updated 2025-12-23 per Binance) gives the [Help] entry point and the counterparty's 10-minute reply window. With the direction reversed, buyers were being warned about the wrong thing and the real trap — being talked into cancelling after paying — went unmentioned.

2026-11-14 · Storing USDT: "no platform can move them" left out the issuer's power to freeze

What changed: The hot-wallet section of where to store USDT safely said that once you hold your own keys, "control of the assets returns to your side, and no platform can move them for you." An exchange indeed can't move coins in a self-custody wallet, but Tether, which issues USDT, reserves in its terms of service the right to freeze USDT in any wallet and to blacklist addresses holding it, and the terms don't carve out cold wallets. The page didn't mention this, which made it easy to assume that coins in your own wallet can't be frozen by anyone. It now says so, and the cold-wallet section and the comparison table were updated to match. The Chinese page was corrected the same day.

Why: Tether's terms of service, checked on 14 November 2026, cover freezing tokens and blacklisting addresses, and Tether's news release of 2 November 2026 gives the scale of its freezes. The only source the page listed, Binance's account-security help centre, says nothing about issuer freezes; the sentence overreached on our part rather than misreading a source.